






















































































































































Why Is the Market Share of Adjustable-
Rate Mortgages So Low?
Emanuel Moench, James Vickery, and Diego Aragon 
Over the past several years, U.S. homebuyers have increasingly 
favored ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages over adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARMs). Indeed, ARMs have dropped to less than 10 percent 
of all residential mortgage originations, a near-record low. 
One might speculate that the decline in the ARM share has been 
driven by “one-off” factors relating to the ﬁ  nancial crisis. However, 
a statistical analysis suggests that recent trends can largely be 
explained by the same factors that have historically shaped 
mortgage choice—most notably, the term structure of interest rates 
and its effects on the relative price of different types of mortgages. 
Supply-side factors, in particular a rise in the share of mortgages 
eligible to be securitized by the housing government-sponsored 
enterprises, also play a role in the low current ARM share.
H
ouseholds ﬁ  nancing a home purchase face a host of important but difﬁ  cult 
choices. They must decide not only how much to borrow and which lender to 
use, but also what type of mortgage best suits their needs. This last choice has 
far-reaching implications—not just for borrowers, but for lenders and policymakers 
as well. 
In the United States, the most popular form of home ﬁ  nancing is the thirty-year 
level-payment ﬁ  xed-rate mortgage, which may be prepaid on demand. Also common 
are amortizing adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), whose rates move with a market 
interest rate.1 Usually, these loans take the form of “hybrid ARMs”; they offer an initial 
period of two to ﬁ  ve years at a ﬁ  xed rate and then switch to an adjustable rate.2 
Understanding what drives the ARM share is of substantial interest to policy-
makers, given the importance of residential mortgages to households’ and banks’ 
balance sheets and to the transmission of monetary policy. U.S. households owe a 
total of $10.2 trillion in residential mortgage debt, representing 73 percent of total 
household liabilities.3 
The sensitivity of this debt to short-term interest rates is important in shaping how 
monetary policy inﬂ  uences the broader economy. In countries like the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia, where most mortgages are tied to short-term interest rates, a 
change in the policy interest rate by the central bank quickly shifts mortgage payments 
1 ARM interest rates are generally linked to a short-term constant-maturity Treasury rate or to the London 
interbank offered rate (Libor). The interest rate adjusts on a regular schedule (for example, once per year or 
once every six months) in line with the current value of the market rate. 
2 Shorter term ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages, such as ﬁ  fteen- and twenty-year loans, are also available but have a 
lower market share, while interest-only and negative amortization mortgages (in which borrowers make no 
payments of mortgage principal during the early years of the loan) gained considerable, albeit temporary, 
popularity during the recent housing boom.
3 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table L.100, 2010:Q1.2
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and cash ﬂ  ows for existing borrowers, potentially inﬂ  uencing 
their consumption. It also shifts the initial cost of new home 
loans, affecting the demand for and pricing of housing.4
In the United States, by contrast, where ARMs are less 
common, the cost of mortgage ﬁ  nance is tied more closely to 
long-term interest rates such as the ten-year Treasury rate, over 
which the central bank has less control. Thus, changes in the 
Fed’s federal funds rate target have only an indirect effect on 
most mortgage interest rates. However, studies suggest that the 
reﬁ  nancing of ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages during periods of falling 
long-term interest rates generates signiﬁ  cant increases in house-
hold consumption. The real effects of these reﬁ  nancing waves 
should be taken into account when forecasting the behavior of 
the household and housing sectors. 
The mix of adjustable-rate and ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages also has 
important risk implications for ﬁ  nancial institutions. Fixed-rate 
mortgages, which generate a long-lived stream of ﬁ  xed cash 
ﬂ  ows, create a “maturity mismatch” for ﬁ  nancial institutions that 
are ﬁ  nanced by demand deposits or other types of short-term 
debt. Fixed-rate mortgages also expose ﬁ  nancial institutions 
to “prepayment risk,” or the risk that borrowers will choose to 
prepay their mortgages. These features make ﬁ  xed-rate mort-
gages challenging from a risk management perspective, an 
important reason for the high level of mortgage securitization 
in the United States.
In this edition of Current Issues, we study recent U.S. house-
hold mortgage trends with an eye to explaining the choices 
homebuyers have made between ﬁ  xed-rate and adjustable-rate 
mortgages. The ARM share has ﬂ  uctuated substantially over time, 
reaching highs of 60 to 70 percent in 1994 but falling signiﬁ  cantly 
in recent years. Indeed, the ARM share is now near a record low: 
ARMs make up less than 10 percent of recent residential mort-
gage originations (Chart 1).
4 This linkage is discussed further in Debelle (2004). Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) 
and the International Monetary Fund (2004) present evidence suggesting that 
macroeconomic volatility is larger in countries with a high ARM share. The United 
Kingdom, motivated in large part by an interest in reducing the sensitivity of 
U.K. household cash ﬂ  ows to short-term interest rates, has considered numerous 
approaches to increasing the share of ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages (Miles 2004). See 
Mishkin (2007) for a further discussion of these issues from a U.S. perspective 
and a more general analysis of how U.S. monetary policy is transmitted through 
the housing market.
What accounts for these trends, particularly the striking 
recent decline in the ARM share? One hypothesis is that house-
hold mortgage choice in the last several years has been largely 
determined by institutional factors related to the ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
such as the collapse of the securitized nonprime mortgage 
market, where adjustable-rate mortgages predominated, and the 
placement of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship. 
A second and related hypothesis is that the crisis has reduced 
demand for adjustable-rate contracts because households have 
become more risk averse following the publicity given to high 
default rates on subprime ARMs, and the reports of “payment 
shock” associated with interest rate resets on ARMs. A third 
hypothesis is that the low ARM share has been driven by the 
same long-run historical factors that shaped mortgage choice in 
earlier periods, such as the term structure of interest rates and 
its effects on the relative price of different types of mortgages. 
Using a simple econometric model, we ﬁ  nd that the low ARM 
share is largely consistent with long-run historical patterns in 
household mortgage choice—namely, that households tend to 
prefer ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages when long-term interest rates are low 
relative to recent short-term rates.
Supply-side effects associated with the ﬁ  nancial crisis also 
seem to have played a role in shaping recent household mortgage 
choices. As part of our analysis, we examine how the ARM share 
Sources: Federal Home Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate Survey; 
Lender Processing Services. 
Notes: Data are monthly and cover the period from December 1989 through
April 2010. Mortgage refinancings are excluded. 
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Understanding what drives the ARM share is of 
substantial interest to policymakers, given the 
importance of residential mortgages to households’ 
and banks’ balance sheets and to the transmission 
of monetary policy.
The ARM share has ﬂ  uctuated substantially over 
time, reaching highs of 60 to 70 percent in 1994 
but falling signiﬁ  cantly in recent years.evolved during the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase 
(LSAP) program. Under this program, the Fed purchased roughly 
$1.25 trillion of ﬁ  xed-rate agency mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) between the end of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2010.5 
Since the Fed did not purchase MBS backed by adjustable-rate 
mortgages, the program could have disproportionately increased 
the supply of ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages, thereby reducing the ARM 
share. We ﬁ  nd, however, that this effect could only have been small, 
since the ARM share was already low before the introduction of 
the program.
Sources of Mortgage Data
Our study uses two complementary sources of mortgage data. The 
ﬁ  rst source is the Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) conducted 
by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. This survey of mortgage 
lenders provides loan-level terms and conditions on conventional 
single-family, fully amortizing “purchase-money” mortgages 
closed on the last ﬁ  ve working days of each month.6 (Excluded are 
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration, mortgages 
guaranteed by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, balloon 
loans, and reﬁ  nancings.) The survey has been conducted since 
the 1970s, although it was signiﬁ  cantly redesigned in 1991. While 
5 Gagnon et al. (2010) present an overview of the LSAP programs and provide 
evidence that these asset purchases led to economically meaningful reductions 
in a range of longer term interest rates.
6 “Purchase-money” mortgages are loans used to fund a home purchase rather 
than to reﬁ  nance an existing mortgage.
participation in the survey is voluntary, the data cover a range of 
different lender types, including saving associations, mortgage 
companies, commercial banks, and mutual savings banks.7 
The second source is a larger loan-level data set, provided 
by the Applied Analytics divison of Lender Processing Services 
(LPS). The LPS data draw on information from nearly all the 
large mortgage servicers and cover about 60 percent of U.S. mort-
gage originations. Because the LPS data have a shorter history 
than MIRS and do not have broad market coverage until recent 
years, our study uses this source only from January 2005 onward. 
While MIRS excludes mortgages used to reﬁ  nance existing 
loans, LPS includes and identiﬁ  es both purchase-money loans and 
reﬁ  nancings. Nevertheless, if reﬁ  nancings are omitted from the 
LPS database, the purchase-only ARM share in the LPS proves to 
be highly correlated with the ARM share in the MIRS (the correla-
tion coefﬁ  cient is 97.09 percent) over the period for which both 
data sources are available, suggesting that they offer a consistent 
picture of changes in the ARM share over time (Chart 1).
Decomposing the ARM Share
The composition of mortgage originations has shifted signiﬁ  -
cantly in recent years. The table above breaks down the aggregate 
trend in the ARM share, based on LPS data, by different mortgage 
7 We calculate the MIRS ARM share using the sampling weights provided in the 
survey, which weight observations across lender types to match market shares 
reported in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data.
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ARM Share of Originations across Mortgage Submarkets
Panel A: All Mortgages
Volume Weighted Value Weighted
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Government 9.5 4.6 3.5 2.7 1.9 4.4 10.1 5.2 4.0 3.1 2.3 4.9
Nonprime 52.5 42.3 12.9 3.6 0.8 1.1 59.9 49.2 19.1 6.7 3.4 2.6
Prime conforming 30.3 27.7 13.7 6.2 2.2 3.7 34.4 33.1 17.0 8.3 2.7 4.8
Prime jumbo 68.7 68.9 51.4 52.8 43.8 37.3 70.4 70.6 55.5 58.9 51.5 43.3
    Total  38.5 33.6 15.6 5.8 2.3 4.0 48.9 44.6 25.6 10.5 4.0 6.1
Panel B: Purchase-Money Mortgages Only
Volume Weighted Value Weighted
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Government 8.0 3.9 3.7 2.9 1.0 2.1 8.7 4.9 4.3 3.3 1.5 2.8
Nonprime 60.4 47.5 12.5 3.4 0.7 0.0 67.3 53.2 17.8 8.7 1.0 0.0
Prime conforming 35.0 28.4 12.3 5.5 2.4 4.0 39.2 33.3 15.1 7.4 3.3 4.7
Prime jumbo 72.4 67.5 49.0 46.1 35.3 43.8 73.7 68.5 53.0 52.5 44.5 43.6
   Total (LPS) 41.8 33.4 14.1 5.0 1.8 3.2 52.3 43.3 23.3 9.0 3.8 5.5
   Total (MIRS) 34.0 24.1 10.7 5.5 1.8 1.8 38.0 28.8 15.9 9.8 3.4 1.8
Sources: Lender Processing Services (LPS); Federal Housing Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS).
Notes: Government mortgages include those insured by the Federal Housing Administration and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. 4
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submarkets: government, nonprime, conforming, and jumbo. 
Loans funded through nonagency MBS markets have declined, 
whereas government loans insured by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and other agencies have increased 
(see the box for deﬁ  nitions of specialized terms).8 
The table reveals a sustained and striking decline in the ARM 
share in each of the four submarkets. This is true whether we 
consider all mortgage originations, which include reﬁ  nancings, or 
only loans used to fund home purchases. In short, the aggregate 
decline in the ARM share is broadly based rather than driven by 
individual shifts in the submarkets. The table also documents a 
consistently higher ARM share in the jumbo market than in the 
conforming market or government market.9
Possible Explanations for Fluctuating ARM Shares
Academic research has identiﬁ  ed a range of factors inﬂ  uencing 
mortgage choice that may help us understand the low ARM share. 
These factors can be categorized as demand-side variables—
relating to household preferences—or supply-side variables, 
8 The relative market shares of the four submarkets do ﬂ  uctuate signiﬁ  cantly over 
this period. For example, the market share of government mortgages, such as 
those insured by the FHA, increases from 3.8 percent of all mortgage originations 
in 2005 to 27.9 percent in 2009 on a value-weighted basis, while the market share 
of nonprime originations falls from 23.0 percent to only 2.3 percent over the same 
period. These shifts largely reﬂ  ect the collapse of the subprime and Alt-A MBS 
markets, developments associated with the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
9 This observation is consistent with the ﬁ  ndings of Vickery (2007).
relating to the availability of mortgage credit from lenders. One 
important demand-side inﬂ  uence is the role of interest rate 
expectations. If households select a ﬁ  xed-rate mortgage, their 
nominal interest rate remains the same until the loan is paid off 
or reﬁ  nanced. For an adjustable-rate mortgage, however, only the 
initial interest rate is known, and the household must form an 
expectation about the future direction of interest rates.
In the view of some analysts, households are largely myopic. 
They choose between adjustable-rate and ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages 
simply by comparing the initial interest rates they would have to 
pay on the two contracts. This view would imply that the initial 
spread between the ﬁ  xed mortgage interest rate and the ARM 
interest rate is the primary driver of the ARM share. 
Forward-looking households, in contrast, are likely to base 
their decision on expectations of average future interest pay-
ments for adjustable-rate and ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages. Since interest 
rates on ARMs are closely tied to future short-term Treasury 
yields while those on ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages are strongly related 
to current long-term Treasury yields, the household’s mortgage 
choice may be related to the term premium on Treasury yields—
that is, the difference between current long-term Treasury yields 
and average expected short-term interest rates.
This hypothesis has been formalized and tested by Koijen, van 
Hemert, and van Nieuwerburgh (2009), who develop a simple 
theoretical model to show that household mortgage choice should 
be linked to the current level of the term premium in long-term 
U.S. Mortgage Market Terminology 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: •   Government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) that purchase and securitize conforming mortgages. “Fannie” 
and “Freddie” guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest 
to investors in agency-issued mortgage-backed securities. On 
September 7, 2008, Fannie and Freddie were placed in conservator-
ship by their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
As conservator, the FHFA was given full powers to control the assets 
and operations of both GSEs.
Mortgage-backed security (MBS): •   A ﬁ  xed-income security whose 
cash ﬂ  ows derive from a pool of underlying mortgages, residential 
or commercial. Residential MBS can be divided into agency, govern-
ment, and nonagency securities. Agency MBS, which are sponsored 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, carry a credit guarantee, ensuring 
that investors do not incur losses in the event of borrower defaults. 
Government MBS are backed by mortgages with explicit government 
credit insurance in case of borrower default, through programs from 
the Federal Housing Administration, the U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, and others. Nonagency MBS are securitized by private ﬁ  nan-
cial institutions and do not carry guarantees against credit losses.
Prime mortgage: •   A mortgage loan to a borrower with low credit risk, 
such as someone with a high credit score, a high down payment, 
and/or a high income level relative to the scheduled mortgage 
payments. The term is often used as a synonym for loans that meet 
underwriting standards set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Conforming mortgage:  •  A mortgage that has a principal balance 
no larger than conforming-loan limits set by the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency and that also meets other underwriting criteria set 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In 2010, the base conforming-loan 
limit for single-family homes in the continental United States was 
$417,000. Limits may be higher (generally up to $729,750) in 
metropolitan areas with high housing costs.
Jumbo mortgage: •   Also known as a “prime jumbo.” These mortgages 
cannot be purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because the 
principal balance exceeds the conforming-loan limit.
Nonprime mortgage:  •  A loan to a borrower who fails to qualify for a 
prime loan. Compared with prime borrowers, nonprime borrowers 
have lower credit scores, lower incomes, or other characteristics that 
suggest a higher probability of default. Nonprime loans include sub-
prime and Alt-A loans. Alt-A mortgages are generally made to more 
creditworthy borrowers than subprime loans, although they are more 
likely to include nonstandard features such as negative amortization.
Government mortgage: •   A loan insured against default by a govern-
ment agency such as the Federal Housing Administration or the U.S. 
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government bond yields. These researchers use different models 
to estimate the term premium. Most important, they consider a 
simple rule of thumb by which households extrapolate expecta-
tions about future short-term interest rates from average short-
term rates prevailing in the last several years.
This rule-of-thumb measure of the term premium has moved 
very closely with the ARM share over the past two decades. 
Models based on alternative term premium measures also 
correlate with the ARM share. Perhaps surprisingly, the simple 
spread between ﬁ  xed mortgage rates and ARM interest rates, or 
between long- and short-term Treasury yields, is signiﬁ  cantly 
less correlated with the ARM share than are these term premium 
measures. In our statistical analysis, we examine both rule-of-
thumb proxies for household behavior and a model-based 
measure of the Treasury term premium as potential determi-
nants of the ARM share.
Another demand-side factor inﬂ  uencing mortgage choice 
is the presence of liquidity constraints. Typically requiring 
lower initial payments than ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages, ARMs may 
be attractive to liquidity-constrained households, such as those 
whose incomes are low relative to the value of their desired home. 
Although it is difﬁ  cult to identify time-series trends in the frac-
tion of liquidity-constrained households, we consider a simple 
measure of housing affordability as a proxy for these constraints. 
A ﬁ  nal demand-side hypothesis is that consumer sentiment 
has simply shifted away from ARMs, perhaps because of negative 
publicity about interest rate resets on subprime ARMs. While we 
do not test this hypothesis directly, a ﬁ  nding that the ARM share 
in recent years has been low relative to normal historical patterns 
would be consistent with such an explanation.
In addition to these demand-based explanations, several 
supply-side frictions might also have played a role in mortgage 
choice, especially during the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis. First, primary 
mortgage rates offered to borrowers are closely tied to secondary-
market yields on mortgage-backed securities. Accordingly, shifts 
in MBS pricing could alter the relative attractiveness of ﬁ  xed-rate 
and adjustable-rate mortgages. We examine this hypothesis by 
considering term structure variables based on actual primary 
mortgage rates, rather than Treasury yields. These variables will 
take into account any increase in spreads between mortgage rates 
and risk-free rates during the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Second, composition shifts between the conforming and 
non-conforming mortgage markets may also have inﬂ  uenced 
mortgage supply. To capture these shifts, we construct a variable 
that measures the share of “jumbo” mortgage originations—that 
is, loans that are too large to be eligible for securitization through 
Fannie and Freddie. Nationally, the size limit for a conforming 
loan is $417,000 for a single-family home, although the Economic 
Stimulus Act, passed in early 2008, permits higher limits (up to 
$729,750) in areas with high housing costs.
Third, ﬁ  nancially constrained mortgage lenders may have had 
less appetite for risk—a condition that would affect both their 
pricing of different mortgage types and their lending standards. 
We assess this possibility by examining a variable that measures 
the average down payment of mortgage borrowers. We also con-
sider a measure of future interest rate volatility as a proxy for the 
cost to lenders of hedging their exposure to the interest rate and 
prepayment risk posed by ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages.
Finally, the Fed’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase program—
designed to support the mortgage and housing markets through 
purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities and other 
assets—may have shifted demand toward ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages.10 
Because all of the mortgage-backed securities purchased were 
backed by ﬁ  xed-rate loans, the program may have disproportion-
ately reduced primary ﬁ  xed rates relative to ARM rates. We inves-
tigate this possibility by examining changes in the ARM share 
around the time of the announcement of the LSAP program.
Determinants of the ARM Share
In this section, we analyze the historical relationship between the 
ARM share and a set of variables measuring the demand-side 
and supply-side factors discussed above. We focus on explaining 
movements in the purchase-only ARM share from the Monthly 
Interest Rate Survey, tracked in Chart 1. (We use the share calcu-
lated from the MIRS data rather than the share from the Lender 
Processing Services data because the former is available over a 
much longer time span.)
We start by deﬁ  ning the explanatory variables used in our 
analysis. We ﬁ  rst consider a variable that simply measures 
differences in initial borrowing costs between adjustable-rate 
and ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages—speciﬁ  cally, the interest rate spread 
between thirty-year ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages and one-year ARMs, 
taken from the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey. 
We consider next the household rule-of-thumb measure of the 
term premium as suggested by Koijen et al. (2009). This mea-
sure is the difference between the ten-year Treasury yield and 
the average one-year Treasury yield over the past three years. 
10 In its announcement of the program on November 25, 2008, the Federal 
Reserve indicated that it would purchase up to $500 billion of agency MBS; 
this amount was expanded to $1.25 trillion in March 2009.
Primary mortgage rates offered to borrowers 
are closely tied to secondary-market yields on 
mortgage-backed securities. Accordingly, shifts in 
MBS pricing could alter the relative attractiveness 
of ﬁ  xed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages. 6
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This “trailing” average is intended to be a proxy for household 
expectations about future short-term interest rates.11 When the 
rule-of-thumb variable is elevated, long-term interest rates are 
high relative to past short-term rates. At such times, mortgage 
demand is expected to shift toward ARMs. We label this variable 
the “Treasury rule of thumb.”
We consider also an alternative rule-of-thumb variable based 
on mortgage rates rather than Treasury yields. This is the differ-
ence between current thirty-year ﬁ  xed-rate mortgage rates and 
the average one-year ARM rate over the past three years, again as 
reported in the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey. 
(Note that this variable differs from the mortgage spread vari-
able, which only compares current interest rates for ﬁ  xed-rate and 
adjustable-rate mortgages.) We label this variable the “mortgage 
rule of thumb.” Since this alternative variable is explicitly based on 
mortgage rates rather than Treasury rates, it will take into account 
any shifts in mortgage interest rates relative to Treasury yields. 
In addition to these backward-looking variables, we consider 
a model-based estimate of the ten-year Treasury term premium. 
This estimate is taken from Adrian and Moench (2010), who 
estimate a statistical model for the U.S. term structure of interest 
rates. Adrian and Moench show that their model ﬁ  ts the U.S. 
Treasury yield curve very well in sample and provides good 
predictions of interest rates out of sample.12 The model is based 
on predictive regressions and therefore likely provides a more 
forward-looking estimate of term premia than the rule-of-thumb 
variables. The computation of the latter, however, requires less 
sophistication on the part of households. 
We also consider the National Association of Realtors (NAR) 
Affordability Index as a rough proxy for liquidity constraints in 
home purchases. It is calculated as the ratio of current median 
family income to the income required to qualify for a median-
priced single-family home loan. We use the Merrill Lynch Option 
Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index as a measure of expected 
Treasury yield volatility. 
11 Following Koijen et al. (2009), we also consider a variant of this rule of thumb 
that is based on the ﬁ  ve-year Treasury yield. However, the measure based on the 
ten-year Treasury yield performs slightly better over our sample period.
12 Their baseline estimates are obtained from a ﬁ  ve-factor afﬁ  ne model of the 
term structure. For an alternative model-based measure of the term premium, 
we considered an estimate from the three-factor afﬁ  ne model of Kim and Wright 
(2005). This second measure yielded similar results.
Finally, we construct two variables from the MIRS data 
itself: the share of jumbo mortgage originations and the average 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. To calculate the share of jumbo loans, 
we match each loan in the MIRS data set geographically to the 
conforming-loan limits in the corresponding metropolitan 
statistical area. Our expectation is that a decrease in the share of 
jumbo mortgages should reduce the overall ARM share, because 
jumbo mortgages are much more likely to be adjustable-rate 
mortgages than are conforming loans. The jumbo loan share falls 
sharply at the end of the sample, partly reﬂ  ecting the increase 
in conforming-loan limits implemented in 2008. The LTV ratio 
measures the mortgage amount relative to the appraised value of 
the property and hence may capture changes in lending standards. 
We ﬁ  rst calculate the correlation between the ARM share and 
each of these variables. Since it typically takes a few weeks to close 
a mortgage contract, we use past values—lagged by one month 
with respect to the ARM share—of the explanatory (or indepen-
dent) variables.13 These correlations, based on monthly data 
between December 1989 and April 2010, are presented in Chart 2.
Consistent with the ﬁ  ndings of Koijen et al., the Treasury and 
mortgage rule-of-thumb variables are highly correlated with the 
ARM share over the past twenty years.14 Notably, the explanatory 
power of these variables is higher than the contemporaneous 
13 We also estimated a different speciﬁ  cation of our model in which the 
explanatory variables were lagged by two months. The regression results from 
this speciﬁ  cation were very similar to the results reported here.
14 While we ﬁ  nd that the mortgage rule of thumb is the variable most correlated 
with the ARM share, Koijen et al. (2009) ﬁ  nd that the Treasury rule of thumb is 
more strongly correlated with the ARM share over their sample, which ends in 
June 2006.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The ARM share of mortgages is from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey. 
Data are monthly and cover the period from December 1989 through April 2010. 
Correlations are measured by the correlation coefficient, which is bounded 
between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 (perfect positive correlation). 
“0” indicates no correlation. “NAR” is National Association of Realtors; “MOVE” 
is Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate.
Chart 2
Correlation between Independent Variables 
and ARM Share of Mortgages
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spread between rates on ARMs and ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages. This 
result is consistent with the notion that borrowers attempt to form 
an expectation about future rates when choosing a mortgage, 
rather than considering only current rates. A high share of jumbo 
loans and a low level of housing affordability are also associated 
with a higher ARM share, although with a somewhat lower cor-
relation. The MOVE Index and the model-based term premium 
measure are only weakly correlated with the ARM share.
To examine these relationships more formally, we estimate a 
statistical model of the joint relationship between the ARM share 
and our set of variables. (Details of the model are described in 
the appendix.) The results of this analysis, documented in the last 
column of the appendix table, show that the mortgage rule-of-
thumb variable, the mortgage spread, and the jumbo loan share 
remain highly signiﬁ  cant in explaining variation in the ARM share, 
while the Treasury rule of thumb makes only a small independent 
contribution to the movement in the ARM share. 
The adjusted R2 of the statistical model described in the 
appendix—a measure of how well the model explains move-
ments in the ARM share over the sample period—is about 
86 percent. Hence, the set of explanatory variables we have 
considered accounts for the historical variation in the ARM share 
very well. This conclusion is also borne out by Chart 3, where the 
model-implied ARM share closely tracks the actual ARM share 
for much of the December 1989-April 2010 sample period. 
Recent Model Performance
How well does the model explain the decline in the ARM share 
over the last ﬁ  ve years? The ARM share implied by the model 
drops sharply from the start of 2006 to early 2009, closely 
matching the decline in the actual data (Chart 4). At that point in 
2009, the ﬁ  tted share based on the model does begin to diverge 
somewhat from the actual share. Overall, however, our set of 
demand- and supply-side variables appears to do a good job 
of explaining the falling ARM share over this period. 
The contributions of the individual variables to the decline in 
the ﬁ  tted ARM share are plotted in Chart 5.15 Clearly, the most 
important determinants of the decline in the ARM share are the 
two rule-of-thumb variables and the share of jumbo loans. Recall 
that the Treasury rule of thumb is the difference between current 
long-term Treasury rates and an average of recent short-term 
Treasury rates. This variable dropped sharply over the past few 
years, from 2.2 percent in January 2006 to -1.3 percent in January 
2009. Thereafter, it began to rise again, reaching 1.7 percent at the 
end of our sample in April 2010. These large movements partly 
reﬂ  ect ﬂ  ight-to-quality effects associated with the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
and the subsequent recovery. 
The mortgage rule-of-thumb variable, which is affected by 
Treasury yields as well as supply and demand factors speciﬁ  c to 
the mortgage market, experienced similar dynamics over this 
period. In fact, even as Treasury yields increased in 2009 and 
2010, rates on ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages remained low. In other words, 
the spread between long-term Treasury yields and ﬁ  xed mortgage 
15 Since our regression model is linear, the contribution of each variable is simply 
the coefﬁ  cient on that variable in the model, multiplied by the cumulative change 
in the value of that variable since December 2006.
Note: The actual ARM share is from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey.  
Chart 3
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Performance of Model in Explaining ARM Share 

















Our model provides persuasive evidence that shifts 
in the term structure of Treasury yields and in the 
relative price of ﬁ  xed-rate versus adjustable-rate 
mortgages, as well as an increase in the share of 
conforming mortgages, have contributed to the 
declining ARM share in recent years.8
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rates declined over this period, helping to keep the ARM share 
low. As shown in Chart 5, these shifts in the term structure of 
interest rates appear to be the most important single explanation 
for the low current ARM share.
The share of jumbo loans has also fallen sharply since the 
onset of the crisis, from almost a third of all mortgage originations 
in early 2006 to less than 10 percent in mid-2008 (in mid-2010, it 
was about 13 percent). This declining share of jumbo loans reﬂ  ects 
mainly two factors: 1) the collapse in securitization of nonagency 
mortgages, including jumbo loans, from late 2007 onward; and 
2) a signiﬁ  cant increase during February 2008 in the size limit for 
conforming loans eligible for securitization through Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. Since the ARM share is signiﬁ  cantly higher in 
the jumbo market, this compositional shift has also contributed 
to the declining share of adjustable-rate mortgages (Chart 5, 
orange portion of the bars).
In sum, our model provides persuasive evidence that shifts in 
the term structure of Treasury yields and in the relative price of 
ﬁ  xed-rate versus adjustable-rate mortgages, as well as an increase 
in the share of conforming mortgages, have contributed to the 
declining ARM share in recent years. 
Nevertheless, we leave open the important question of exactly 
why the spread between ﬁ  xed mortgage rates and Treasury bond 
yields has narrowed so much since the start of 2009. One poten-
tial explanation is that ﬁ  nancial market conditions have gradually 
normalized over the past year, leading to a partial unwinding of 
the ﬂ  ight to quality that sharply reduced Treasury yields in 2008. 
A second explanation is that the supply of Treasury securities 
relative to that of mortgage-backed securities has increased, 
owing to signiﬁ  cant issuance of new Treasury debt combined 
with the Federal Reserve’s effort to support the housing and 
mortgage markets by purchasing more than $1 trillion of agency 
mortgage-backed securities to date.16 It does not appear, how-
ever, that the Federal Reserve’s purchase program was a key factor 
in the decline of ARMs over this period. The ARM share was 
already extremely low by the time the program was announced 
in November 2008.
Conclusion
We have analyzed recent trends in households’ mortgage 
decisions, focusing in particular on the choice between ﬁ  xed-
rate mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages. We document 
that the market share of ARMs has declined signiﬁ  cantly across 
all segments of the mortgage market in recent years. Using 
a simple model, we present evidence that this decline in the 
ARM share can largely be accounted for by factors that explain 
mortgage choice in earlier periods—in particular, measures of 
the relative borrowing costs for ﬁ  xed-rate and adjustable-rate 
mortgages. Supply-side factors, especially the increasing share 
of the conforming mortgage market, are also important in 
accounting for the fall in the ARM share over this period. 
While the variables included in our model account for most 
of the recent variation in the ARM share, other factors related to 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis may also have had some effect on household 
mortgage choice in recent years. Among these factors, the imple-
mentation of the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchase program does 
not appear to be a dominant explanation for the fall in the ARM 
share, since this share was already at historic lows before the 
announcement of the program in November 2008.
16 For more on the impact of the Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases, see, 
for example, Gagnon et al. (2010) and Stroebel and Taylor (2009).
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the statistical model estimated in the appendix.  
Notes: “MOVE” is Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate; “NAR” is National Association of Realtors; “LTV” is loan-to-value ratio.
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  Appendix
  The Econometric Model
The simple correlations reported in Chart 2 cannot capture the multiple 
joint relationships that may exist between the set of explanatory 
variables and the ARM share. Nor can they assess the likelihood that 
the correlation is simply due to chance, rather than an underlying 
economic relationship. To address these concerns—albeit in a partial 
way—we estimate univariate and multivariate linear regression models 
of the determinants of the ARM share as a function of the potential 
determinants of mortgage choice considered here.a The results are 
presented in the table below. For each variable, the slope coefﬁ  cient 
reported in the table reveals the effect of a one-unit change in the 
variable on the predicted ARM share. 
The two rule-of-thumb variables appear to be the most important 
determinants of the ARM share, as measured both by their R2 in the 
univariate speciﬁ  cations and by their contribution to the multivari-
ate model. The adjusted R2 for the multivariate speciﬁ  cation is 0.86, 
suggesting that our set of variables captures most of the variation in 
the ARM share over the sample period. The mortgage rule-of-thumb 
variable alone has an R2 of 0.63.
We also experimented with versions of our regression model that 
exclude supply-side variables such as the share of jumbo loans. If we 
exclude these variables, the model is less effective in explaining the 
recent decline in ARMs—an outcome that conﬁ  rms the importance 
of these variables for understanding the currently low ARM share. 
Determinants of the ARM Share: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: MIRS Purchase-Only ARM Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mortgage spread
(ﬁ  xed-rate minus adjustable-rate) 9.38*** 6.22***
[3.34] [4.96]
Treasury rule of thumb 9.21*** 2.65**
[8.88] [2.42]
Mortgage rule of thumb 11.10*** 8.29***
[9.13] [5.04]
Term premium (Adrian-Moench) 2.34 -0.42
[0.90] [-0.51]
NAR Affordability Index -0.40*** 0.02
[-5.35] [0.34]
MOVE Index -0.11 0.04
[-1.24] [1.44]
Share of jumbo loans 1.58*** 0.65***
[5.36] [3.85]
Average loan-to-value ratio 2.07* -1.38***
[1.67] [-4.24]
Adjusted R2   0.311 0.594 0.634 0.019 0.240 0.042 0.295 0.109 0.861
Number 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
Notes: Speciﬁ  cations (1) through (8) report slope coefﬁ  cients for univariate time-series regressions. Speciﬁ  cation (9) reports slope coefﬁ  cients for a multivariate time-
series regression. All speciﬁ  cations use Newey-West standard errors with twelve lags. Data are monthly and cover the period from December 1989 through April 2010. 
The t-statistics are reported in brackets. Means and standard deviations for each variable used in the multivariate regression are as follows: Treasury rule of thumb 
(0.9, 1.0), mortgage rule of thumb (1.4, 0.9), mortgage spread (1.7, 0.7), term premium (1.7, 0.8), Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index (103.0, 24.1), 




a Note that, by construction, the share of ARMs is bounded between zero and one. This censored support of the dependent variable in our regressions might 
introduce a bias in the parameter estimates. As a robustness check, we estimate the same set of regressions as in the appendix table, using a model in which 
the ARM share is transformed using the inverse normal cumulative density function. The results of these regressions are very similar to those of the linear 
speciﬁ  cations documented above, so we do not report them here.10
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A Private Lender Cooperative Model for Residential 
Mortgage Finance
Toni Dechario, Patricia Mosser, Joseph Tracy, James Vickery, 
and Joshua Wright 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 466 
August 2010
This study presents a set of six design principles for the reorgani- 
zation of the U.S. housing ﬁ  nance system and applies them to 
one model for replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that has so 
far received frequent mention but little sustained analysis—the 
lender cooperative utility. The authors discuss the pros and cons 
of such a model and propose a method for organizing partici-
pation in a mutual loss pool and an explicit, priced government 
insurance mechanism. They also discuss how these principles 
and this model are consistent with preserving the “to-be-
announced,” or TBA, market—particularly if the ﬁ  xed-rate 
mortgage remains a focus of public policy.
Companion Video
Joe Tracy and Joshua Wright assess the merits and drawbacks 
of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, outline design principles for a reformed home 
ﬁ  nance system, and weigh the pros and cons of replacing 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with a lender cooperative. 
Available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/video
_interviews.html
TBA Trading and Liquidity in the Agency MBS Market
James Vickery and Joshua Wright
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 468
August 2010
Most mortgages in the United States are securitized through 
the agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market. These 
securities are generally traded on a “to-be-announced,” or TBA, 
basis. This trading convention signiﬁ  cantly improves agency 
MBS liquidity, leading to lower borrowing costs for households. 
Evaluation of potential reforms to the U.S. housing ﬁ  nance system 
should take into account the effects of those reforms on the 
operation of the TBA market.
MBS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom
Adam Ashcraft, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, and James Vickery
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 449
May 2010
The authors study credit ratings on subprime and Alt-A mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) deals issued between 2001 and 2007, 
the period leading up to the subprime crisis. They ﬁ  nd that the 
amount of credit enhancement increases with the amount of 
mortgage credit risk (measured either ex ante or ex post), suggest-
ing that ratings contain useful information for investors. However, 
the authors also ﬁ  nd evidence of signiﬁ  cant time variation in 
risk-adjusted credit ratings, including a progressive decline in 
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standards around the MBS market peak between the start of 2005 
and mid-2007. They observe, conditional on initial ratings, under-
performance (high mortgage defaults and losses and large rating 
downgrades) among deals with observably higher-risk mortgages 
based on a simple ex ante model and deals with a high fraction of 
opaque low-documentation loans. These ﬁ  ndings hold over the 
entire sample period, not just for the deal cohorts most affected 
by the crisis.
Subprime Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race, 
Ethnicity, and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing
Andrew Haughwout, Christopher Mayer, and Joseph Tracy
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 368
April 2009
Some observers have argued that minority borrowers and 
neighborhoods were targeted for expensive credit in 2004-06, 
the peak period for subprime lending. To investigate this claim, 
this study takes advantage of a new data set that merges demo-
graphic information on subprime borrowers with information 
on the mortgages they took out. In a sample of more than 75,000 
adjustable-rate mortgages, the authors ﬁ  nd no evidence of adverse 
pricing by race, ethnicity, or gender in either the initial rate or the 
reset margin. Indeed, if any pricing differential exists, minority 
borrowers appear to pay slightly lower rates, as do those borrow-
ers in Zip codes with a larger percentage of black or Hispanic 
residents or a higher unemployment rate. Mortgage rates are also 
lower in locations that previously had higher rates of house price 
appreciation. These results suggest some economies of scale in 
subprime lending. Yet there are important caveats: the authors 
are unable to measure points and fees at loan origination, and the 
data do not indicate whether borrowers might have qualiﬁ  ed for 
less expensive conforming mortgages.
Subprime Mortgage Lending in New York City: 
Prevalence and Performance
Ebiere Okah and James Orr
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 432
February 2010
Subprime mortgage lending expanded in New York City between 
2004 and mid-2007, and delinquencies on these subprime loans 
have been rising sharply. The authors use a rich, loan-level data 
set of the city’s outstanding subprime loans as of January 2009 
to describe the main features of this lending and to model the 
performance of these loans. The subprime loans represent a 
smaller share of total housing units in the city than is true 
nationwide. In addition, they are found to be clustered in 
neighborhoods where average borrower credit quality is low 
and, unlike prime mortgage loans, where African-Americans 
and Hispanics constitute relatively large shares of the population. 
The authors estimate a model of the likelihood that these loans 
will become seriously delinquent and ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant role for 
credit quality of borrowers, debt-to-income and loan-to-value 
ratios at the time of loan origination, and estimates of the loss 
of home equity.